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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSITY

ETHICS CENTER
(

FLETCHER
AND CONOLLY
DEBATE ACTIVE
EUTHANASIA
Joseph F. Fletcher, Visiting Professor of Medical Ethics at the University .
of Virginia, explored the morality of
active euthanasia with Matthew Conolly, Professor of Medicine and Phar'acology at UCLA, on April 8 at
.Jma Linda. Fletcher argued that active euthanasia is moral and should
now be a legal option. Conolly took
strong exception on both Christian
and medical grounds. James Walters
moderated the discussion as well as a
Medicine and Society conference earlier the same day at which Fletcher
presented a lecture on the "Management of Terminal Illness."
Professor Fletcher, one of the first
Protestant thinkers to explore the
bioethical dilemmas of the modern
age,
published
his
pathfinding
Medicine and Morals in 1954. A
longtime professor of ethics at the
Episcopal School of Theology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Fletcher and
his wife now divide their time between
Charlottesville, Virginia and Anna
Marie Island, Florida. Fletcher celebrated his eighty-second birthday
while at Loma Linda.
I
Doctor Conolly received his medical
training at Westminster Hospital, London University. He now serves the
UCLA Medical Center's Support Services Team which cares for the termi';lly ill. In addition to a distinguished
.edical career in England, Conolly
served as Advisor to the House of
Lords Committee Against Euthanasia
in 1977.

YODER ADDRESSES
ETHICISTS AT LLU
John Howard Yoder, Professor of
Theology at the University of Notre
Dame, delivered the presidential address at a conference of the Pacific
Section of the Society of Christian
Ethics hosted by LLU on February 20.
James Walters, the Ethics Center's
Associate Director, was elected chairman of the association. Jerry McCarthy, an ethicist at St. John's Seminary,
Los Angeles Diocese, was elected
. program chair.
In addition to Yoder's presentation,
seven ethicists presented papers that
covered the waterfront of Christian
ethical concerns: Mark Kowalewski ,
USC, "A Pilgrim People: Toward a
Processive-Dialogical Ethics in the
Community of Faith;" Anthony Battaglia, CSU, Long Beach, "Sects or Denominations: Possibilities for Theology
in a 'Post-Churchly' Situation;" Vernard Eller, University of La Verne,
"Another Big Try at Church and Sect;"
Francis Colborn, Claremont Colleges,
"Bernard Lonergan's Method and
. Theological Ethics;" David Larson,

The discussion of active voluntary
euthanasia culminated a four-month
series of Medicine and Society conferences on the treatment of the severely and terminally ill. Earlier sessions dealt with "Do Not Resuscitate"
orders, the foregoing of nutrition and
hydration, and the factor of cost in
million dollar cases. Video cassettes
of the Fletcher and Conolly discussion
as well as the earlier sessions may be
purchased from the Media Services
department of the Loma Linda University Library for $25 each.

LLU,
"Personhood's
Priority
in
Biomedical Ethics;" Brent Waters, University of Redlands, "Star Wars and
Just Wars;" and Paul Bube, USC,
"Prayer and Social Ethics."
Yoder argued that the Bible is a decisive resource for contemporary social ethics. He cited five New T estament church practices, including baptism and the breaking of bread, which
exemplify social norms for contemporary life. The practices are wholly
human and empirically accessible as
human actions, yet the Bible sees
them as acts of God. "God is doing
them in, with, and under the human
practice. What is being done on earth
is done in heaven," he stated.
From Yoder's close study of early
Christian practices, he concluded that
(1) there is no fundamental distinction
between genuine sacraments and appropriate Christian social action, (2)
the doctrine of redemption is just as
important to social ethics as is the
doctrine of creation, and (3) the "good
news" has direct implications for the
ordering of human life since these
mandates are only generally realized
through current notions of socialism,
democracy and egalitarianism.
Yoder's paper produced lively discussion. Some wondered if the practices cited by Yoder were grounded
in - or were merely corroborated
by - the realm of -redemption (or revelation). Yoder refused to draw a
dichotomy between the realm of redemption or revelation and that of creation or reason; rather he argued that
too often the Biblical affirmations of
egalitarian and communal practices
.are ignored and undervalued.

THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS REGARDING AIDS
Fritz Guy
Associate Minister
Lorna Linda University Church
Theology is thinking about the
meaning of religious faith. Because
religious faith is related to all of
human existence or experience, so is
theology. It is possible (and often useful) to "think theologically" about all
sorts of things - that is, to think
about the meaning of religious faith
for an understanding of nature, science, medicine, education, sports,
sex - whatever.
In a Christian context, to think
theologically about AIDS includes at
least these three ideas: (1) AIDS is
not God's will for anyone; (2) AIDS is
an opportunity for Christian service;
(3) AIDS is not the final word about
the patient. Let me try to unpack
these ideas very briefly.

AIDS is not God's will for anyone. It is not punishment for sin ("divine retribution"). It is the result of a
series of natural processes. Even if
you regard intravenous drug abuse or
homosexual activity as sinful, the fact
remains that such activity is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition
for the occurrence of AIDS.
It is a basic Christian conviction that
the best clue to the character and activity of God is Jesus of Nazareth.
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When some friends of Jesus asked
about a particular victim of disease,
"Who sinned, this man or his parents?" Jesus answered, "Neither"
(John 9:2-3). The mistake made by
Jesus' friends here was the assumption of a direct, cause-and-effect connection between one's moral choices
and one's circumstances. Jesus
pointed out that reality isn't that simple.
In the case of AIDS, this kind of
mistake is probably a response to
(and rationalization of) two universal
human problems. On the one hand,
there is our personal fear and anxiety.
AIDS represents two aspects of
human reality that often make people
rather uncomfortable: sexuality and
death. (This anxiety, by the way,
seems to be as typical of physicians,
nurses, and hospital chaplains as it is
of the rest of humanity.)
On the other hand, there is human
pride or self-righteousness, which has
a convenient hierarchy of vices. Some
sins, especially sexual ones, are often
considered disreputable, while others,
especially attitudinal ones, don't even
count. According to Jesus, the truth of
the matter is quite different: for the
blatantly unrighteous there is the possibility of acceptance and forgiveness
and an eternal future; but for the
smugly self-righteous there is no future at all.
AIDS is an opportunity for service. Both its terror and its hopelessness give it a special claim on Christian attention and concern.
Jesus of Nazareth is not only our
best clue to the character and activity
of God; he is also our best clue to the
meaning and fulfillment of humanness. In what he said and what he
was we see what it means to be truly
human. He said, for example, "Do for
others what you would want them to
do for you" (Matthew 7:12). And when
he met the victims of leprosy (which
was for his time and place what AIDS
is for us), he listened to them, talked
to them, touched them, healed them
(e.g., Mark 1:40-45; Luke 17:11-19).
When he was criticized for being too
friendly with disreputable persons he
said that the reason he cared about
them was that God cared about them
(Luke 15).
Jesus made it clear that humanness

is fulfilled in giVing, serving, helping.
When he was talking about the ultimate meaning of human existence, he
described a scene in which the King
of all reality said to some people, "I
was sick and you looked after me,"
and to others, "I was sick and you
didn't look after me" (Matthew
25:36,43). To take the religion of
Jesus seriously is to respond to
human need.
The kind of service Jesus was talking about has two important characteristics. It is done without regard to
the "worth" of those served : he
washed the feet of Judas. And it was
done without regard to self-interest:
he was most interested in people who
couldn't possibly return the favor.
This, of course, is what God is and
does: he gives himself for the benefit
of the unworthy. This is the meaning
of agape; this is the "good news."
And this is the kind of opportunity
we have in relation to patients with
AIDS. They can never pay us back.
They will not become producti
members of society. They will not dl.
nate a small fortune to fund medical
research; they often will not even pay
their own medical bills. Those who are
not already Christian will probably not
be converted. But they are all sick,
and they need to be cared for. And
that is what matters.
There are many ways to care. One
possibility is personal interaction: investing time and interest, being present and listening. Another possibility
is the establishment of structures of
care - such as volunteer organizations to make sure that patients are
cared for, and hospices like the one
established by Mother Theresa in
New York.
Still another possibility is influencing
public policy to address the public
need. There needs to be massive
public funding , not only for research
but also for care, as the number of
cases increases and the costs soar
into billions of dollars. And there
needs to be broad AIDS education in
public and private schools and in the
various information media. Such
things are more likely to happen
there is vigorous and persistent cor ..
munication with legislators and other
public officials, and if there is discus(continued on page 8)

NURSES AND 'NO CODE' ORDERS
Donna J. Fritz, R. N.
Nursing Staff Development
Lama Linda University Medical Center
Are "No Code" orders moral? Of course they are! The
absence of "no code" orders on specific patients is immoral. Four major issues are especially important to
nurses: (1) patient autonomy, (2) the role conflict of the
nurse, (3) decision-making, and (4) family education.

Patient autonomy. Nurses place a high value on the
ethical principle of patient autonomy. This principle was
also supported by the President's Commission on
Bioethics, which recommended that treatment decisions
should be discussed with a competent patient or the incompetent patient's surrogate.
DNR decisions should be based on the moral values of
the patient, preferences concerning the meaning, sanctity,
d quality of life from the patient's own point of view. Are
the patient's present choices consonant with his or her nature as a person?

"Decisions should be based upon the
moral values of the patient, preferences
from the patient's own point of view."

Role Conflict. Role conflict is the greatest source of
stress for the nurse who is caught in an ethical web. The
nurse is responsible to three different entities. The nurses'
primary responsibility is to the patient; nurses act as patient advocates within their responsibilities as the most visible and constant care-givers during hospitalization. But the
nurse is also responsible to protect the interests of the
hospital and to carry out the orders of medical therapy.
The nurse contends with these three sometimes competing
interests, but she or he must also act according to her or
his own ethical principles in each situation.
How can the nurse's integrity b~ preserved when the
wishes of a patient or family regar8ing a DNR response
are in direct conflict with the physician's orders or how can
the nurse ethically justify disregarding the family's or patient's wishes in order to carry out hospital policy? What is
the nurse's obligation when a morally wrong decision is
\ade by someone else and the nurse is expected to imr-I(ement the orders resulting from that decision? How can

the institution provide "moral space" for nurses?
Decision-making. Health professionals, including
nurses, do not usually have enough training in making
ethical decisions. We feel that there are no right answers.
We empathize and agonize with our physician colleagues
over ethical decisions. Many discussions about whether it
is time to write a DNR order for a specific patient are initiated by nurses. To postpone the decision or to make no
decision is a decision to "code" the patient.
Yale-New Haven Hospital documented six communication problems related to DNR orders. Two of these are
that: (1) Some members of the health-care team who have
important information may not share it because they are
unaware that a decision is to be made or because they are
fearful that they may be viewed as overstepping their
bounds. (2) Discussion with the patient is initiated much
too late, so late that the patient may be incompetent.
A DNR order is a team decision. "None of us is as smart
as all of us." There should be interdisciplinary discussionof the patient's status and goals. Each one on the team
must understand the reason for writing or not writing the
DNR order. It is important that the nurse be present when
the DNR discussion takes place with the family. The nurse
can then reinforce aspects of the discussion and can answer the questions of the patient or family based on the
specifics of the discussion.
Members of the health team should talk with the patient
or family before the patient is taking the last breath. Nothing is more stressful for the nurse than waiting "momentarily" for a decision to be made as the patient's blood pressure and respiration decline.
Nurses care for patients on a sustained basis, attending
to basic intimate, physical and emotional needs. Because
of proximity, the nurse may be the one with whom the patient chooses to discuss the matter.
Physicians should document in the progress notes the
discussion with the family or patient and then record the

"How can the institution provide 'moral
space' for nurses?"

specific DNR order. Unfortunate errors of commission and
omission have been made in implementing DNR orders
because of paperwork blunders.
Family Education. Do families really understand the
terminology we use in discussing the patient's condition?
3

Do they know what the "everything" means in "do everything you possible can?" Some families have been surprised by the presence of an endotracheal tube and a ventilator because they did not realize that this was part of the
bargain in saying "everything."
Families need to understand that "no code" does not
mean "no care." Although some treatments will be discontinued, the family needs to understand that we will vigorously pursue the goals of comfort and dignity for the patient and that we will make support of the family a high
priority. Under these circumstances nursing care is intensified. The family responds best to nursing behavior directed toward patient comfort and the provision of information regarding the patient's condition.
In summary, patient autonomy should be a primary consideration in making the decision about the DNR order.
The nurse has valuable information about the patient's
view of what it means to be sick. Because of her or his
proximity to the patient, the nurse plays a key role in aiding decision-making. and family education.

WHAT IS A 'NO CODE' ORDER?
Richard L. Sheldon, M.D.
Associate Professor of Medicine
Loma Linda University
"No code" orders are implemented in intensive-care settings by use of the term "do not resuscitate" or DNR. Many
feel that this term is so inaccurate as to destroy the entire
concept. "Do not resuscitate" sometimes wrongly implies
withholding food and water, placing the patient "out behind
the barn" or "leaving the litter along the trail" as the rest
press on. In fact, all patients coming to the hospital are resuscitated - given air, either ambient or enriched, plus
food and water. The real question is, should we give
emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation or emergency
CPR? Some sl:lggest that we should replace the term "do
not resuscitate" with "no emergency CPR."
The great ethical dilemmas in medicine, such as those
surrounding "no code" orders, center around establishing a
balance among the demands of (1) justice, (2) beneficence, and (3) autonomy.

"Families need to understand that 'no
code' does not mean 'no care.'"

To establish an ethical balance among these three areas
is difficult and challenging. To comRlicate matters, the balance should be achieved in a settinZg where adequate discussion and reason are available. Unfortunately, intensivecare units are filled with patients, families, and staff who
may be anxious, angry, disappointed, fearful, and guiltladen. To find the right atmosphere in which to make "no
code" decisions requires an active commitment on the part
of everyone involved.
4

Balance must be achieved to serve the demands of justice, beneficence, and autonomy. However, other issues
also demand consideration: the demands of science, law,
cost containment, public relations, accurate record-keePr
ing, and many more.
Nevertheless, if a hospital and its staff can deliver highquality medical care in a setting of justice, beneficence,
and autonomy for each patient, that hospital and staff will
achieve a standing of inestimable value.

LET'S REPLACE
"DO NOT RESUSCITATE"
WITH "CARE FOR THE DYING"
Kenneth G. Jordan, M.D., F.A.C.P.
Assistant Professor of Neurology
Loma Linda University
It is fitting and proper for medicine to establish
guidelines to address hopelessly ill patients. Our humanitarian instincts dictate that irreversibly and irreparably ill
persons facing imminent death or a vegetative existence
should not be subjected to "advanced life support and
maximal therapeutic efforts," which at best will forestall the
inevitable, and at worst increase morbidity. (1,2,3) Experience has shown that these patients, even if they are successfully resuscitafed, do not survive their hospital stay.
(4,5) Economic constraints have emphasized the high cost
of intensive life support, and a litigious climate makes a
sanctioned hospital protocol desirable. The question is,
what policy should guide us?

"Nothing is more stressful for the nurse
than waiting for a decision to be made as
the patient's blood pressure and respiration decline."

Closely examined, most current DNR policies fail the
test of logic. They do not work well and do not serve the
needs of dying patients. They are illogical because there
are no characteristics inherent to CPR which qualify it to
be the centerpiece of a medical policy towards the dying.
Other interventions may be equally, if less immediately, required to reverse catastrophe and prevent death: chest
tubes, transfusions, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, cardiac
pacemakers, and emergency surgery. Setting aside its
urgency and drama, CPR is no different in principle from
many other methods we use to preserve and prolong life.
Even monitoring a patient's electrocardiogram or checking
his blood gases, electrolytes and blood counts, serve the
same purpose in th_eir mundane way. While sometimes
considered "heroic," CPR today is a rather ordinary procedure which in its basic form is taught to camp counselors,
boy scouts, teachers and taxi drivers. Unfortunately, mos~
DNR policies have elevated the status of CPR so that it

dominates their philosophies and is considered the
touchstone of .our interaction with dying patients.
Much confusion and inconsistency have been created in
~e process. A recent article stressed the widely-held view
\at "DNR orders do not and should not be interpreted to
imply any other change in the level of medical or nursing
care." (1) This dictum reverberates among most hospital
policies. (6,7,8) Yet, what is the logic with a hopeless,
dying patient, of withholding CPR on humanitarian grounds
but intervening in other ways for "reversible conditions"
which will prolong his dying? I am not referring to withdrawing ongoing treatment, pain control, water or nutrition.
But, to the extent a physician is willing to judge his patient
as irreparably and irreversibly ill facing imminent death or
a vegetative existence, then all additional interventions, not
only CPR, become useless and even intrusive. To the extent that a physiCian decides additional interventions are
not useless, he has implicitly judged his patient as not irreparably and hopelessly ill, and it is arbitrary to withhold
CPR alone.

"Some physicians fear that DNR status
will expose their patients to less thorough
care."
We have all experienced this arbitrariness. Among 72
DNR patients, Evans and Brody found no consistent pattern in the range or kind of other interventions ordered6% received "all interventions except resuscitation," 50%
-"\ceived "some medical interventions for reversible condiJns," and 36% received "no additional interventions." (9)
Uhlmann and colleagues reported that 43% of DNR orders
were ambiguous about further treatment limitation plans.
(8) They noted that cross-covering physicians were uncertain how to interpret the intent of DNR orders toward transfusions, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, and admission to the
intensive-care ' unit. Highlighting confusion in this area, a
recent editorial tried to "clarify" DNR policy by changing the
name of the order to "No Emergency CPR," causing us to
wonder who gets "non-emergency CPR?" (7) It is unlikely
that simple name changes will add clarity.

"CFD would stress providing a new level
of care and attention to the dying patient."

Criteria for DNR orders are vague. A recent study found
that 38% of patients declared DNR did not arrest and left
the hospital alive. (11) I<yff, et al., reported an 11 % survival
rate for patients who received CPR in the hospital and a
16% survival rate for ICU patients ' tonsidered DNA. (12)
Residents, attending physiCians, and community practitioners were found to differ significantly in their DNR decisions. Residents more often favored withholding support
than practitioners, with attendings holding an intermediate
"')sition. These physicians varied greatly in assessing the
_..eversibility of a patient's illness and in their perceptions of

a patient's quality of life. (13) Lo and Steinbrook stressed
that some patients who accepted DNR status before a
crisis changed their minds in the face of rapid deterioration. (16) These data raise disturbing questions about the
accuracy and objectivity of DNR decisions.
Moreover, our DNR policies are not achieving what
many see as their most important goal, to insure that physicians consult early with patients and families in order to
allow them "autonomy of judgment." (14) Studies show that
this occurs with disappointing rarity. Bedell and others
found that of 389 patients subsequently placed on DNR
status, only 11 % had an abnormal mental status on admis-

"Each one on the team must understand
the reasons for writing or not writing the
DNR order."

sion. However, before the decision to write a DNR order
was made, 76% had become confused or comatose, excluding them from involvement. (11) Uhlmann, et al. , reported that among patients declared DNR at the Portland
VA Medical Center, only 43% were involved in the decision. (10) More striking was Evans and Brody's finding that
only 26% of DNR patients were consulted by physicians.
(9) Thus the practice of DNR policies is at variance with
their ethical goal of prior consultation with patients.
When physicians do discuss this sensitive issue, they
vary greatly in their styles, vocabulary and demonstrations
of empathy. Miller and Lo reported marked differences in
the ways physicians described CPR and its possible outcomes. (15) Some physicians avoid describing CPR, feeling it would cause the patient "too much worry." Others
hesitated to recommend a course of action, fearing to impose their wishes on patients even when guidance was requested. A simulation study found the physicians' personal
assumptions and values, often unconsciously conveyed, influenced the patient's choice. (15)
In medicine we are at our best when guided by reason
and compassion. Most DNR policies address the broad
needs of dying and hospitalized patients with little explicit
compassion. (3) This omission, perhaps stylistic, sends a
regrettable message. Thus, while DNR policies mention the
importance of providing continued comfort and support, in
reality, patients on DNR status are frequently cast in a lesser role. An informal survey of house staff by Donnelly
found that, to them, DNR was equated with "no hope," "no

"The great ethical dilemmas in medicine
center around establishing a balance
among the demands of justice, beneficienee, and autonomy."
care," "do nothing," and "do not treat." Some physicians
fear that DNR status will expose their patients to less thorough care by nurses and cross-covering physicians. (7) I
believe these prejudices arise from the emphasis of DNR
5

policies on sparing the dying patient intervention, instead
of intervening to ease his passage. DNR policies, as reflected in their name and by virtue of their focus, stress the
withholding of care from individuals at a point in their lives
when, even more than death, they fear abandonment and
loneliness.
It is my view that instead of a "Do Not Resuscitate" policy, we need to "Care for the Dying" (CFD). A CFD policy
would acknowledge the logical and consistent view that
once a patient has entered the process of dying or a vegetative existence, all additional interventions to prolong life,
be they heroic or mundane, should properly be withheld.
This would include CPR, antibiotics, antiarrhythmics, transfusions, intensive care and surgery. These patients should
also be spared the pain of venipuncture and arterial blood
gas determinations, as well as the unnecessary discomfort
of radiological procedures and frequent awakenings for
vital signs. At the same time, CFD would stress providing
a new level of care and attention to the dying patient. Sufficiently potent and frequent doses of pain relievers could
be given without 'ambivalence. Visiting hour limitations
could be suspended. Family members in emotional dis-

In my opinion, a policy to Care for the Dying would be
intuitively more satisfying for members of the medical team
and for patients. It would allow us to face our patients and
their families early and speak to them without apology
about withholding unnecessary interventions, because we
would offer them at the same time a supportive and positive approach to ease their passage. It would remove the
burden of trying to reconcile the artificial distinction between CPR and other interventions. By being more logical,
a CFD policy would be more consistently implemented. By
being explicitly compassionate, it would be more emotionally acceptable to physicians and nurses who would be
able to see themselves as providing for, not just withholding from, their patients. Hopefully, while achieving these
goals, it would also encourage us to remember - perhaps
with regret, but certainly without shame - that even in
this advanced technological wonderland of modern
medicine, we can cure all too rarely and treat only sometimes. Yet, we can comfort always.
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"Intensive-care units are filled with patients, families, and staff who may be anxious, angry, disappointed, fearful, and
guilt-laden."

tress could be provided with trained support. Children
could be encouraged, with guidance, to say good-bye to
their loved ones. Remote family members could be contacted and assisted in paying one last visit. Religious
needs and involvement of the patient's clergyman would
be emphasized. Rounds could be used to the staff's benefit by discussing the specific emotional and ethical issues
the patient's treatment raises. The medical and nursing
team would see their roles as positive ones, of providing
care, comfort and company to the patient and his family.
This shift in attitude would do much to prevent the de-

"Most current DNR policies fail the test of
logic. They do not work well and do not
serve the needs of dying patients."

moralizing negation which at times repels us from the
dying patient's bedside.
CFD could address other needs of hospitalized, dying
patients and their physicians. Not all patients need to or
should die in the hospital. There isrnuch to be said for allowing a person to die among th~ comforting familiarity
and memories of his own home. Physicians may feel uncertain or uncomfortable about judging certain patients
hopelessly ill. They may desire and should receive assistance from medical, religious or bioethical conSUltants. A
CFD Committee could be helpful to monitor the application
of hospital policy towards the hopelessly ill.
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The Pandora's Box of Human

Lijt~

Society's Issue: Is Biology or Personality the Essential Ingredient?
By JAMES W. WALTERS
The Vaticart has opened a Pandora's box
that won't be closed until society answers
a fundamental .question: Is biology or
personality the essential ingredient of
valuable human life? Rome 8ay~ biology.
Society increasingly says personality.
The question is not new, but the debate is
ratcheted up .several notchel! by the promulgation of the Roman Catholic Church's
statement of doctrine, "Respect for Human
Life in Its Origins and on the Dignity of
Procreation. "
The biological model holds that every
manifestatiOn of Homo sapiens is of intrinsic
worth. Therefore the Vatican !!peaks of
the embryo as "the unborn child" who
"must be cared for~ to the extent possible,
in the same way as any other human being
as far as medical assistance is concerned."
The Vatican is unflinchingly consistent
in reasoning that theetpbryo · "must be
treated as a person." Even in~vitro fertilization, which utilizes the husband's
!!perm, is banned because, among other
objections, unused embryos might be used
for experimentation or destroyed outright.
The incapacity of one out of five couples to
procreate is lamented but is no excuse for
sinning against the natural, hence moral,
method of human reproduction.
The personality model argues that the
essence of being human is not genetic
composition but uniquely personal capacities-for example, the capacity for rational
creativity. Thus the more artificially procreation is done, the more "human" it is
because it involves personal creativity.
The personality. model draws a fundamental distinction between mere human
being and valuable personal being. All
humans are not personal, and all persons
are not human. Individuals in a permanent
coma are undeniably human, but queStionably personal; "ET" is an engaging little
person, but surely is not human.
Persons are defined as individuals who
are capable ·of self-awareness, rational
choice, loving and being loved. An embryo
does not possess these capacities; neither
does a fetus, nor for that matter a newborn. Those who advocate personhood
criteria for determining valuable life
are liberal regarding abortion and nontreatment of severely handicapped newborns; however, they are the first to
contend for animal liberation-particularly
the right to life of dolphins, whales and
primates.
Neither position takes its case to a
logical, if extreme, conclusion. The Vatican gives weight to humanhood, but it
does not conclude that medical science
should attempt to arrest the high rate
(over 50'%) of spontaneous · abortions of
embryos, and thus potentially save millions
of lives. Philosopher Michael Tooley, a
leading advocate of personhood, argues
that infanticide is intrinsically moral but,
because of untoward social consequences,
unwise.
The question is not one of absolute
rightness, but of weighting. And such
weighting in a democracy is determined
by neither Pope nor philosopher, but by a

people's collective experiencing of and
thinking about human life. The church is
to be praised for putting a long-simmering
discussion on the front . burner. Indeed,
legislation is needed to keep technology in
place, but the contours of the legislation
must emerge lrom public discussion:
An appropriate social policy in a pluralistic, non-sectarian state is neither a
thoroughSoing· biolpgica1 nor a personal
model of a human being, but a reasonable
compromise.. A basic reasonableness suggests two important standards determining the value of early human life: potentiality and proximity -derived from the
biological and per.sonal models, respec..,
tively.
Potentiality suggests that the human
conceptus is not just any tissue, bitt is
uniquely endowed with the potential of
attaining full human status .if nature takes
its normal course. In one sense all humans
are merely potential persons, for no one
has achieved his or her ideal potential;
Ute embryo is merely the weakest of the
weak. As such, it could be argued thilt
the conceptus deserves the protection of
law, just as the law now protects other
classes that have faced discrimination
at the hands of the strong-slaves, foreigners, blacks, women. The civility of a society
may be determined by the manner in which
it treats its most vulnerable members.
(The norm in Western countries that are
involved in embryo research is tolirntt
invasive procedures to subjects fewer than
14 days old. )
Proximity means that the embryo-fetus
is a person in the process of becoming, and
the greater the approximation of personhood, the greater its value. Proximity
grants the potential of the newly fertilized
single-cell zygote but distinguishes between its value and the value of a mature
human person. The difference is so signifi-

cant that most reasonable persons do not
believe that the right of a conceptus to life
is as weighty as the right of a woman -to
take a morning-afterpW.
The Supreme Court's Roe vs. Wade decision used approximation-of-personhood
reasoning in.dividing human gestatiqil into
trimesters. DurIng the fU'St trimester a
woman has free choice without the poBlIibUity of state regulation; in the subsequent
trimesters the state may sequentially rewlate and then ban abortion.
Approximation-ol-personhood now alSo
applies at the other edge or life. A yt!ar.
ago this month the judicial council of the
American Medi~ Assn. ruled that physietans could ethicany withdraw all artificial life ·support, including nutrition and
hydration, from patients who -were in
comas reasonably determined to be permanent. These individuals are fully alive
human beings in that their brain stems
are intact and sustaining Circulation and
respiration. But' because their personal
capacities for self-awareness and rationality are irretrievably lost, they no longer
possess a Unique claim to continued existence.
Coma cases are the opposite of embryos.
With coma patients, proximity is great but
potentiality is nil. With embryos, proximity
is small but potentiality is great. In both
cases many persons will ethically justify
termination of support because the human
subjects are so distant, in either potentiality
or proximity, from personhood.
This balance, or conflict, will be crucial
in sorting out the numerous conundrums
that await us in the Pandora's box of policy
decisions affecting human life.
James W. WaUers is an associate professor
of Christian ethics at Lorna Linda University
and the chairman of the Pacific section of the
Society of Christian Ethics.
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(continued from page 2)

sion in public forums like letters to
editors and talk shows. We can let
people know that AIDS patients must
be cared for, even if it means - as it
surety will - less money for ourselves
because of higher taxes and insurance premiums.
AIDS is not the final word
about a patient. It is a terrible, tragic
word, but it is not the last word. Jesus
of Nazareth is the best clue to the
meaning of human existence and
everything it contains. For him, suffering and death were not the last word.
The last word was victory over suffering and death.
As of now, AIDS is absolutely fatal.
But the patient as a person can be
healed in the · way that matters most
(I do not say this gJibly, but very deliberately). Typically the patient feels
abandoned by family and friends. If
the patient is homosexual, he already
feels rejected by society in general.
And this feeUng may be internalized
as guilt - riot only because of what
he does, but because of what he is. In
this abandonment and guilt, there is
no good medical news - no prospect
of a cure, not even any hope of a
miracle. Despair is eminently understandable.
But there is the possibility of love
and acceptance, mediated by persons
who are willing to care. This is even
more important than extending the patient's life. And for this we will need
people. We will need personnel for
whom caring is not only a professional
function but also a personal ministry.
We will also need an army of volunteers who will invest themselves in
terms of their presence.
For a Christian health-care community AIDS is a challenge to live its
theology.

Dax Cowart, Ross Campbell, and
Jack Provonsha were the principal
speakers at "Ethics at Life's End," a
seminar the Ethics Center presented
on March 9 at LLU's 55th Annual
Postgraduate Convention. About 125
physicians, nurses, and other professionals participated in the day's activities.
The seminar began with the presentation of "Please Let Me Die," a filmed
interview of Dax Cowart several
months following a 1973 automobile
accident that left him blind and severely burned. During the interview,
Mr. Cowart repeatedly and thoughtfully requested that his treatments be
terminated so that his life could end .
When questioned at the LLU conference, Cowart reasserted his belief
that his therapy should have been discontinued even though he has been
able to complete college and law
school, pass the Texas bar, and establish a law practice since his accident.
Ross Campbell, a health-care attorney with Musick, Peeler, and Garrett
in the San Francisco Bay area., detailed the expectations of current
California law as available in recent
statutes as well as in the Barber,
Bouvia, and Bartling cases. He emphasized the usefulness of durable
powers of attorney for specifying legally authorized decision-makers in difficult cases.
Jack Provonsha, a physiCian and
ethicist who serves as chairman of the
Ethics Center's Board of Directors,
discussed the issues of the day from
the perspective of Christian moral
thought. He distinguished several
forms of death (mind, brain, organ,
cellular) and argued that modern technological resources require one to
focus upon the death of the mind
even as the body is respected for its
symbolic value. Provonsha also emphasized the priority of a competent
patient's free and informed decision.

PAPERS SOLICITED
FOR THE 1988
ABORTION CONFERENCE
Scholarly papers from a variety of
perspectives and professions are solicited for the Ethics Center's 1988
conference on "Abortion and Adventism Today." These papers will be presented at the conference, revised at
their authors' discretion in light ot
questions and criticisms, and pub·
lished in an anthology that reveals
current Adventist thought. This collection of essays will enable Adventist individuals and institutions to formulate
their own conclusions regarding abortion with awareness of what their colleagues are thinking.
Papers may be either descriptive or
prescriptive. Descriptive studies will
analyze the denomination's past and
present attitudes. Prescriptive essays
will defend recommendations regarding abortion in Adventist families, institutions and political efforts.
Any person with a point of view regarding abortion in Seventh-day Adventist thought and life who is interested in presenting a paper at the
conference is invited to contact David
Larson at the Ethics Center as soon
as possible.
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